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A Generic Model of Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Reputation
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium for inflation
under the generic assumption that monetary policy reflects
proximate preferences for low expected inflation and positive
unexpected inflation. The paper stresses the qualitative
implication that in a reputational equilibrium the policymaker
behaves as if it is concerned about controlling inflation, even
though it does not have a direct preference for a low actual
inflation rate. The analysis also shows how the sovereignts
prospects for survival and the private agents' memory process
play critical roles in determining whether the reputational





Providence, RI 02912Recent contributions to the theory of monetary policy,
building on the ideas in Kydland & Prescott (1977) and in Calvo
(1978), have analyzed the inflationary implications of including
in the proximate objective function for policy a preference for
positive unexpected inflation. This preference could reflect
various underlying real objectives of monetary policy, such as
high aggregate economic activity, low real cost of servicing
nominally denominated debts, or high revenue from seigniorage.
Other plausible assumptions about the underlying objectives of
monetary policy imply that the policymaker is also proximately
concerned about the demand for real money balances and,
accordingly, prefers low expected inflation. This preference
could derive from interest in, for example, allocative efficiency
or enhancement of the sovereign's revenue prospects, especially
potential seigniorage. Importantly, although the preferences for
low expected inflation and positive unexpected inflation are
generic, if the underlying objectives of monetary policy involve
real economic outcomes, then the policymaker has no reason to be
separately concerned about actual inflation. A generic
specification of the proximate objective function of monetary
policy involves actual inflation only as a component of unexpected
inflation.
The analysis of Kydland & Prescott and of Calvo assumes that
the expectations of private agents are rational in the extended
sense that they reflect the objectives and strategic
considerations that determine policy choices. This analysis also
recognizes that, because the policymaker exercises the powers of
sovereignty, announcements about intended policy actions are not
binding commitments. Accordingly, the theory restricts private
agents to form an inflationary expectation that the policymaker
voluntarily would choose to validate. The literature denotes such
a self—confirming expected inflation rate as "time consistent".—2—
The set of time—consistent expectations depends not only on
how private agents form expectations, but also on the strategy
used by the policymaker to choose policy actions. The analysis of
Kydland & Prescott and of Calvo, as well as the elaboration of
this analysis in Barro & Gordon (August 1983) and in Barro (1983),
assumed that the policymaker takes the expectations of private
agents about future policy actions as given. Other authors——for
example, Taylor (1983) and Grossman & Van Huyck (1986, 1987)——have
emphasized that this assumption can have grossly unrealistic
implications. Specifically, if policymakers actually ignored any
effect that their current actions have on expectations of future
policy actions, then debt repudiation, expropriation of capital,
and, in the present context, hyper—inflation would be common
policies. For example, in Calvo's analysis, the unique time—
consistent expectation equals the maximum feasible inflation
rate.[Kydland & Prescott, Barro, and Barro & Gordon avoided this
result only by arbitrarily assuming that, in addition to
preferring positive unexpected inflation, the policymaker is
averse to high actual inflation rather than to high expected
inflation.]
A more interesting specification of policymaker strategy,
utilizing the concept of reputation developed in Barro & Gordon
(July 1983), emphasizes a linkage between current policy actions
and expected future policy actions. Reputation enables the
policymaker, who cannot make binding commitments, nevertheless to
influence expectations about future policy through its decision
either to validate or to invalidate expectations about current
policy.
The present paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium for
inflation under the generic assumption that monetary policy
reflects proximate preferences for low expected inflation and
positive unexpected inflation, but is not separately concerned—3--
with actual inflation. This analysis confirms thata reputational
model generally yields an enlarged set of time—consistent
expectations, but it emphasizes that reputational considerations
also can alter the qualitative properties of equilibrium
behavior. Specifically, reputational considerationscan cause the
policymaker in the present context to behave as if it is concerned
about controlling inflation, even though it does not havea direct
preference for low actual inflation.
This result, which was already implicit in the analysis of
seigniorage maximization by Grossman & Van Huyck (1986), creates a
strong presumption that reputation plays an essential role in the
actual formulation of monetary policy.[Barro & Gordon did not
see this result because, even after introducing reputation, they
continued to specify aversion to high actual inflation asa
separate element of the policymaker's proximate objective
function.] An analogous result, derived in the reputational model
of sovereign debt analyzed in Grossman & Van Huyck (1987), is that
the sovereign faithfully meets its debt servicing obligationseven
though it has no moral compulsion not to repudiate its debts.
In addition to focusing on a generic objective function of
expected and unexpected inflation, the present paper extends the
analysis of monetary policy and reputation by treating the
sovereign's survival in power and, perhaps more importantly, the
memory of private agents as stochastic processes. In this
context, the analysis stresses the association of reputation with
the sovereign, rather than with the individualpolicymakers who
act as agents of the sovereign, to emphasize that the preference
for positive unexpected inflation derives from theunderlying
objectives of the sovereign as the principal and not from the
relation of the policymaker to the sovereign.[The model
implicitly assumes that the process by which the sovereign
appoints and removes the individuals who make monetary policy
causes policy to reflect the sovereign's underlying objectives.]—4—
The analysis that follows shows explicitly how the
policymaker's concern for the sovereign's reputation expands the
set of time—consistent expectations, which otherwise would include
only the pathological outcome of hyperinflation, to include
patterns of monetary policy that are both realistic and relatively
benign.In addition, the analysis derives conditions under which
reputational considerations can produce even the same outcomes
that would obtain if the policymaker could commit its future
policies. More generally, the analysis shows how the sovereign's
prospects for survival and the private agents' memory process play
critical roles in determining the characteristics of the
reputational equilibrium and whether this equilibrium approximates
a hypothetical equilibrium with binding commitments.
1. Policy Objective
Assume, as motivated above, that monetary policy in period
tmaximizesthe expectation of the present value of a periodic
function of expected inflation and unexpected inflation. This
expectation, U, is given by
T+h
(1)U =E exp [—rA(t—t)] u(e, e), t=t
with r )0,X )0,
>
U10 as e e, u11 < 0,
0 as Pt— e ii > 0, u < 0,
and Pt
where Eis an operator that denotes an expectation conditional
on information valuable in period r,h is an horizon that
corresponds to the prospective longevity of the sovereign's—5—
survival in power, ris the discount rate per unit of calendar
time that embodies the sovereign'spure time preference, A
measures the interval between points in time at which private
agents adjust their expectation of inflation, this interval being
the relevant length of a period in units of calendartime, et is
the private agents' expectation of the inflation rateduring
period t, and Pt is the actual inflation rate during
period t.
The function u(.) has a maximum with respect toet at
et equal to e,and a maximum with respect top— e at
Pt— e equal to II.An important assumption is that IIis
strictly positive——that is, whatever the expected inflation rate,
the policymaker prefers a positive amount ofunexpected
inflation. For simplicity, the analysis treats and IIas
constants. The maximum possible inflation rate is ,whichwe
could assume to be infinite. Finally, it is convenient to scale
the objective function such that u(,O) equalszero.
The analysis assumes that the sovereign's longevity, h
periods, is a random variable defined over the non—negative
integers, and, for simplicity, assumes that in any unit of
calendar time the probability that the current sovereignty will
terminate is l—y, where 0 y1. Thus, the probability
nA that h will turn out to be less than n+l periods is1—y
Because h is unbounded, evaluating Urequires a calculation
of expected utility over an infinite horizon, with utilityduring
period t discounted to reflect the probability that h would




The analysis assumes that private agents know ,y,and the
function u(.), as well as all other aspects of the structure of—6—
the model. Note that, if the probability per period of
termination, l—y',is positive, then Uis defined even if
r equals zero and equals unity. The analysis also assumes
that the policymaker can control the actual inflation rate
exactly.
2. A Committed Monetary Policy
Suppose that the policymaker could irrevocably commit
monetary policy to be consistent with an announced path of future
inflation rates. Such an irrevocable commitment would determine
inflationary expectations. In this case, the policymaker's
problem would amount to choosing the program {e, to
maximize Uas given by equation (2) subject to the constraint
that Pt must equal et for all t. The first—order condition
for this problem would be
(3)u1(e,O) =0for all t.
The value of et that would satisfy equation (3) is e.Thus,




Substituting equation (4) into equation (2) gives
(5)U =[1_(81)X] u(e,0) > 0.
Equation (5) says that, if the policymaker could make an
irrevocable commitment, it would be able to achieve the positive
expected value for its objective function associated with the best
expected inflation rate and zero unexpected inflation.—7—
3. An Opportunistic Monetary Policy
In reality, monetary policy is not subjectto irrevocable
commitments. Accordingly, although providinga useful benchmark,
the preceding case does not providean empirically relevant
analysis of monetary policy.
To consider another useful benchmarkcase, suppose that the
policymaker in addition to being incapable of making irrevocable
commitments, sets monetary policy without regard either forits
own announcements about policy intentions or forany effect that
the actual inflation rate has on inflationaryexpectations.
Instead, the policymaker opportunistically chooses theprogram
to maximize U, taking the private agents!expectation
about future inflation rates as given. The first—ordercondition
for this problem would be
(6)either u2(e,Pt— e)0 with
Ptp for all t
or u2(e, Pt— e) > 0 withPt = forall t.
Condition (6) implies that, with a hypotheticallyopportunistic
monetary policy, the inflation rate would satisfy
(7)Pt =mm(e+ II, )forall t.
Assuming that private agents correctly perceive the
policymaker's opportunistic strategy, expected inflation would be
consistent with equation (7)——that is, expected inflationwould
satisfy
(8) e =mm(e+ II, p) for all t.—8—
Equation (8) says that private agents would know that, if expected
inflation were less than the maximum inflation rate, the
opportunistic policymaker would create actual inflation higher
than expected inflation. The key to this result is the assumption
that 11is strictly positive, which implies that u2(e,O) is
strictly positive.
Combining equations (7) and (8) yields a unique equilibrium
in which
(9) et =Pt
= for all t.
Equation (9) says that, as in Calvo's analysis, an opportunistic
monetary policy would result in expected and actual inflation
equal to the maximum inflation rate. In other words, an
opportunistic monetary policy would imply hyperinflation.
[As noted above, Kydland & Prescott, Barro and Barro &Gordon
avoided this conclusion by the contrivance of assuming that the
policymaker is averse to high actual inflation rather than to high
expected inflation. For example, if we changed the first argument
of the u(.) function from et to Pt' without changing any
other properties of this function, then the first order condition
for opportunistic maximization of U1 could be u1 +U2 = 0
with e < e = <p.]
Substituting equation (9) into equation (2) gives
(10) U =[1(1)A]1u(,O) =0.
Equation (10) confirms the general result that an opportunistic
monetary policy would yield an expected present value for the
objective function unambiguously smaller than would a committed
monetary policy.—9—
4. A Reputational Equilibrium
The analysis in the preceding sections assumed either that
the policymaker irrevocably commits itself to a path of future
inflation rates, in which case actual and expected inflationwould
equal the best expected inflation rate, or that the policymaker
behaves opportunistically, in which case actual andexpected
inflation would equal the maximum possible inflation rate. To
develop a more realistic analysis, suppose that, although the
policymaker cannot make irrevocably commitments, it can influence
expectations about future monetary policy by its choice of current
monetary policy.
The linkage between actual monetary policy and inflationary
expectations is the sovereign's reputation for validating
expectations. Given this linkage, a rational policymaker would
consider how its current monetary policy will affect the
sovereign's reputation and how the sovereign's reputation affects
inflationary expectations. Only a policymaker that irrationally
ignored the sovereign's reputation would behave opportunistically.
To analyze the determination of the sovereign's reputation,
assume that policymakers acting as agents of a sovereign always
behave rationally, except for an infinitesimal fraction,c, of
cases in which policymakers inexplicably fail to exercise the
rational ability to resist the temptation to behave
opportunistically. Private agents might attribute such a loss of
rational restraint either to the idiosyncratic irrationality of
the sovereign or to a breakdown in the process by which the
sovereign translates its preferences into policy. In any event,
private agents view a loss of rational restraint, however
uncommonly it occurs, to be an intrinsic and irreversible
attribute of the sovereign.— 10—
Giventhis pattern, private agents attach probability l—,
which equals approximately unity, to rational and, hence, non—
opportunistic behavior as long as private agents do not recollect
any instance of opportunistic behavior by the policymaking agents
of the existing sovereign. In this case, private agents expect an
inflation rate, denoted by p, that has two essential
properties. First, p* is self—confirming——that is, given that
private agents expect p, if the policymaker plans to validate
inflationary expectations by setting t' for all t > Ti equal
to p, the expected present value of the objective function is
at least as large as it would be if the policymaker were to set
opportunistically. Second, p is the member of the set of
expected inflation rates that have this self—confirming property
that produces the largest value of U. [Given the fixed non—
stochastic structure of the model, p* is constant.] An
announcement by the policymaker that the inflation rate will be
p* would be credible and by focusing expectations could insure
that p equals the best self—confirming expected inflation rate.
If, alternatively, the private agents were to remember that
policymaking agents of the existing sovereign had behaved
opportunistically, then they would expect opportunistic behavior
in the future. In this case, the expected inflation rate would
be .
Notethat this analysis is concerned only with the
expectations of atomistic private agents and does not require or
involve collusive strategic behavior by private agents. Although
the assumed reaction of inflationary expectations to opportunistic
behavior and the punishment strategy assumed by Friedman (1971,
1977) in his analysis of supergames impose similar constraints on
the policymaker's choice problem, we must be careful not to press
this formal similarity too far. Specifically, we cannot appeal to
strategic or game—theoretic considerations to provide a priori
rationale for assumptions about the expectations of atomistic— 11—
privateagents. Rather, the only relevant a priori consideration
is that these assumptions generateself—confirming expectations.
[In some situations, of course, either the relevantprivate agents
are large like labor unions or consortia of creditorsor the
relevant interactions involve a few largeparticipants in the
policymaking process like different political parties, different
branches of government, or even differentgovernments. In these
cases, a theory of punishment strategies rather than atheory of
expectations and reputation would be relevant.]
Let k denote the number of periods for whichprivate agents
would remember an instance of opportunisticbehavior, where
ok .Theanalysis assumes that k is a random variable
and, for simplicity, assumes that inany period the probability
that private agents would permanently forgeta past instance of
opportunistic behavior is a constant l—, where 0 1.
Thus, the probability that k would turn out to be less than
n-I-i periods is 1 —S.If cSequals unity, then k is
infinite and a sovereign would never recovera trustworthy
reputation once it had been lost.
Given that in period Tthe sovereign has a reputation for
validating expectations, these assumptions about expectations
imply that
(11) for t =-r,e =p,and




Taking account of reputation, the policymaker's problem inperiod
-ris to choose a program to maximize U, as given by
equation (2), subject to Condition (ii). The bestself—confirming— 12—
expectedinflation rate, p, is the solution to this problem.
The analytical problem of characterizing the reputational
equilibrium simply involves the determination of p.
To derive p, define Vto be the expected value of the
sovereign's utility over an horizon that corresponds to either the
prospective longevity of the sovereign's survival in power or the
prospective longevity of private agents' memories of opportunistic
behavior, whichever is shorter——that is
T+min(h,k)
(12) V =E X(tT)u(e, e).
t=t
Only at most the next k periods are relevant to the policy
choice, because the sovereign's utility after period t+k is
independent of the inflation rate chosen in period r.Given the
stochastic processes that generate h and k, equation (12)
implies
(13) V = (86)A(tt)u(ePt— e).
According to equation (13), the contribution of expected utility
in period t to Vis smaller the larger is t,the larger is
the sovereign's rate of pure time preference, the larger is
probability that in any period the current sovereignty will
terminate, and the larger is the probability that in any period
lenders would forget a past instance of opportunistic behavior.




whereV is the value of VT that results from setting Pt for
all tT equal to p* and V is the value of Vthat would
result from setting pequal to mm (p* +IT,p). To calculate
Vk, substitute p* for et andt in equation (13), to obtain
(15) V* =(1_A)lu(p*,0), where 0 a 1.
To calculate V, observe that by settingT equal to
mm (p* +n, j),the policymaker would obtain a value for its
objective in period r equal to u[p*, mm(r[, p_p*)]• At the
same time, by condition (11), such opportunistic behavior would
cause the sovereign to lose its reputation for validating
expectations. Consequently, in the next h or k periods, the
equilibrium with an opportunistic monetary policy would obtain.
In such an equilibrium, as indicated by equation (10), the
policymaker would obtain a value of zero for its objective. Thus,
we have
(16) V =u[p*,mm (,p_p*)]•
Given equations (15) and (16), condition (14) implies that
is a self—confirming inflation rate for any value of aA.
Notice also that u[p*, mm [,_p*)]is larger than u(p*,0)
for any value of p* less than p.Thus, if a were zero——that
is, if the policymaker completely discounted future realizations
of its objective——or ifA were infinite——that is, if the private
agents waited forever to adjust their expectations in response to
opportunistic behavior——then, because the policymaker prefers
positive unexpected inflation, the set of self—confirming
inflation rates would consist only of .Inthis case, p
would equal p.
More generally, if a is positive andAis finite, then
inflation rates less than also can be self—confirming. A— 14—
positivevalue of cimplies less than infinite pure time
preference, i.e., larger than zero, a positive probability
that the sovereign will survive in power, i.e.,y larger than
zero, and a positive probability that private agents would
remember an instance of opportunistic behavior, i.e., Slarger
than zero. A finite value of A implies that private agents
periodically adjust their expectation of inflation in accord with
the policymaker's behavior.
More exactly, given equations (15) and (16), condition (14)
implies that for p to be lower than p, must be large
enough and the increment to the periodic value of the objective
associated with opportunistic behavior must be small enough that





If such self—confirming values of p exist, then p is the
member of this set that maximizes V.
T
In the hypothetical case of a committed monetary policy,
analyzed in equations (3) —(5),the optimal value of
given equal to et for all t T,was.Giventhat the
reputational equilibrium also implies t equal to et for all
t T,if the set of self—confirming inflation rates contains an
inflation rate as low as ,thenp* also equals i——that is,
the reputational equilibrium would be the same as the outcome of a
hypothetically committed monetary policy.
To determine the conditions under which e is a self—
confirming inflation rate, it is necessary to evaluate condition
(14) under the hypothesis that p equals .Makingthe
appropriate substitutions in equations (15) and (16) shows that,
for p to be equal to— 15—
V =(1_aA)u(,O) I
mustbe at least as large as
V0 =u[,mm(Ii, p—)J. I
Thiscondition implies that must be large enough and the
increment in the current value of the objective associated with
opportunistic behavior, given that expected inflation equalse,
must be small enough to satisfy
(18)a1 >1— u(e,O)
u[, mm(II, p4)]
If condition (18) is not satisfied, then e is not in the
set of self—confirming inflation rates.In that case, note that
the value of V* decreases monotonically as p* diverges from
i——that is, from equation (15),
(1a1)u1(p*,O) -0as p* I • forall t
Consequently, if p does not equal ,thenp* is higher than
and is the member of the set of self—confirming inflation rates
that is closest to e.
5. Extensions
The concept of reputation developed in thispaper focuses on
the expectations of private agents about the strategy employedby
the policymaker. The analysis abstracts from other sources of
uncertainty about the behavior of the policymaker. Specifically,— 16—
theanalysis assumes that private agents know the objectives of
the policymaker and that the information that the policymaker uses
in making policy choices is publicly available.
For many, if not most, situations, these assumptions seem to
provide a useful simplifying approximation to reality. The
assumption that the policymaker's objectives are known is
consistent with the observation that in many cases informed
observers can predict future policy actions as well as the
policymaker itself. This observation suggests that the main
source of uncertainty involved in forecasting future policy
concerns the realizations of exogenous random variables that
constrain policy choices and not the objectives of the
policymaker. The assumption that relevant current information is
publicly available seems appropriate to the extent that this
information involves published data on economic aggregates and
observations on current events like weather and war.
An important extension of the analysis, however, would be to
model the parameters of the proximate objective function as truly
variable. Such modelling would seem essential to the generation
of hypotheses that are testable with time series data. The
essential econometric point, emphasized by Cooley, LeRoy & Raymon
(1983, 1984) and developed further by Grossman (1984), is that
models, like the above example, that admit counterfactual
questions about the effects of parameters having different
constant values are in general inappropriate for formulating
conditional forecasts of the effects of hypothetical realizations
of exogenous variables.
A closely related extension of the analysis to a stochastic
environment involves the formulation of actual monetary policy as
state contingent together with the associated generalization of
the analysis of reputation. Grossman & Van Fluyck (1987) developed
the theoretical form for this generalization in the course of
analyzing explicit default and potential repudiation of sovereign
debts.— 17—
6. Summary
This paper has considered a generic model in whichmonetary
policy attempts to maximize the expectation of the present value
of an objective function that retlects preferences for low
expected inflation and positive unexpected inflation.
Importantly, this objective function does not involve actual
inflation other than as a component of unexpected inflation.
In this model, if, hypothetically, the policymaker, as the
agent of the sovereign, could irrevocably commit monetary policy
to be consistent with an announced path of future inflationrates,
then the equilibrium would be the best expected inflation rate and
zero unexpected inflation. Such a commitment, however, would not
be time consistent, and, hence, would be neither crediblenor
feasible. If, at the other extreme, the policymaker
opportunistically attempted to create positive unexpected
inflation, taking expected inflation as given, then in equilibrium
the actual and expected inflation rates would equal the maximum
possible inflation rate.
To develop a more realistic framework, the analysis focused
on a reputationa]. equilibrium in which the actual and expected
inflation rates are equal to the best self—confirmingexpected
inflation rate. A self—confirming expected inflation rate has the
property that, if private agents expect this inflation rate, the
policymaker chooses to validate this expectation rather than to
behave opportunistically. In other words, if the expected
inflation rate is self—confirming, then the associated value to
the policymaker of maintaining the sovereign's reputation for
validating expectations is greater than the value of creating
temporarily high unexpected inflation. The equilibrium inflation
rate is the self—confirming expected inflation rate that yields
the highest expected present value for the policymaker's
objective.— 18—
Ifthe set of self—confirming expected inflation rates
contains the inflation rate that would be the equilibrium with a
hypothetically committed monetary policy, then that inflation rate
is also the reputational equilibrium. For such a low expected
inflation rate to be self—confirming, the policymaker cannot
discount the future too heavily——that is, the probabilities per
period that the sovereign will survive in power and that the
private agents would remember an instance of opportunistic
behavior both must be large——and the increment in periodic value
of the objective that would result from opportunistic behavior
cannot be too big.If these conditions are not satisfied, then
the reputational equilibrium would be the lowest inflation rate in
the set of self—confirming expected inflation rates.If the
sovereign discounts the future very heavily and gets great benefit
from positive unexpected inflation, then the reputational
equilibrium might not support any outcome that is better than the
opportunistic equilibrium. Importantly, except in this extreme
case, reputational considerations cause the policymaker to behave
as if it is concerned about controlling inflation——that is, it
sets policy to keep the inflation rate below the fastest possible
rate and perhaps as low as the best expected inflation rate——even
though it does not have a direct preference for a low actual
inflation rate.— 19—
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